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ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING THAT THE ORDER
VIOLATES ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
At pages 3, 18 and 20 of the Brief of Respondents (HBr.
of Re."), the Board argues that Plaintiffs cannot rely on the
provisions of Art. I, § 7 of the Constitution of Utah to determine
the propriety of the Order.

The Board correctly states at page 3

of the Br. of Re. that Plaintiff's docketing statement does not
rely on Art. I, § 7, nor was that Constitutional provision relied
upon by Plaintiffs in the proceedings before the trial court.
There are well established exceptions to the general rule
that the reviewing court will consider an appeal only upon the
theories advanced in the trial court.

For example, "Exception to

the general rule has been made in some cases where the newly
advanced theory involves only a question of law arising upon the
proved or admitted facts, and is finally determinative of the
case."

5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 546.

See State v. Lee,

633 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981); Earl M. Joraensen Co. v. Mark Construction,

Inc., 540 P.2d

978

(Hawaii

1975);

and

State v.

Northwestern Construction, Inc., 741 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1987). Thus,
when the new theory only involves a question of law, it is clearly
discretionary with the court hearing the appeal as to whether there
would be any impropriety in considering the newly advanced theory.
Surely,

since the consideration of the subject appeal on the

theory of a violation of Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 does not require
1

the reconsideration of any facts, everyone will be better served
by considering the issue now, rather than forcing Plaintiffs to
present the issue upon remand or upon the filing of a new action.
Another important exception to the general rule is that
a new theory raised for the first time on appeal may be considered
by the reviewing court to serve the ends of justice or prevent the
denial of fundamental rights.

See State v. Lee, supra; Weems v.

United States, 217 U.S. 349, 54 L. Ed. 793, 30 S. Ct. 544 (1910);
and Swift v. Kelso Feed Co., 161 Kan. 383, 168 P.2d 512 (Kan.
1946).

Plaintiffs have consistently maintained that the Order

constitutes a deprivation of their fundamental rights. Even though
such claims were couched in the context of Utah Const. Art. X, §
8

and Utah Code Ann. 53-6-20 before the trial court, such

fundamental rights are clearly protected by Utah Const. Art. I, §
7 given the same facts.
One additional exception to the general rule comes into
play "When the question is of such a nature that the present
welfare of the people at large, or a substantial portion thereof,
is involved . . . . •• 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and Error § 551. Under
such circumstances an appeal court is authorized in its discretion
to direct its attention to such public concerns rather than be
hamstrung by technical pleading. See Earl M. Jorqensen Co. v. Mark
Construction, Inc., supra. Swift v. Kelso Feed Co., supra; and
First National Bank v. South Land Production Co., 189 Okla. 9, 112
P.2d 1087 (Ok* 1941). A substantial portion of the general public

2

will be well served by the court's consideration of Plaintiffs'
Art. I, § 7 argument.

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS' LIBERTY INTERESTS ARE VIOLATED BY THE ORDER
Aside from pointing out that the Honorable trial court
Judges disagree with Plaintiffs' position, the Board relies solely
on Logan City School District v. Kowallis, 94 U. 342, 77 P.2d 348
(1938) for the proposition that the Order does not violate Art. I,
§ 7 of the Constitution of Utah.

As the Board correctly quotes

Kowallis at page 23 of the Br. of Re.:
The provision for being open . . . simply means
that all children must have equal rights and
opportunity to attend the grade or class of
school for which such child is suited by
previous training or development.
It is also noted that there is no requirement
that every school building shall be open to
every school child in the state. The provision
is that the system of public schools shall be
open to all children of the state. There shall
be provided, for each child in the state, a
school suitable to its development and
training, and as reasonably convenient for
attendance as is practicable, which school such
child shall have a right to attend. And when
the public schools are open to all children on
the same and equal terms, compliance has been
had with this clause of the Constitution.
(Emphasis added.)
What the Kowallis Court said about Utah Const. Art. X,
§ 1, is equally persuasive with respect to Art. I, § 7. Note that
the Kowallis opinion said each child must have equal rights, not
that it is preferable that each child have equal rights. Note also

3

that Kowallis clearly established the right to attend the school
which is as reasonably convenient for attendance as is practicable.
One of the great classic

legal definitions

is the

definition of justice as the "equal treatment of equals."

The

Order simply does not treat equals equally. Pursuant to the Order,
a plaintiff like Mrs. Espinal, for example, does not have a right
to send her children to the high school as reasonably convenient
for attendance as is practicable, while other parents of the same
minority and socio-economic status, having children with the same
academic achievement scores, and living the same distance from the
same high school, are accorded such convenience.

The very right

to attend denied Mrs. Espinal's children is the very right to
attend granted to the children of others who are indistinguishable
from Mrs. Espinal by any criteria considered by a majority of the
Board when adopting the Order. Such disregard of the equal rights
belonging to all children as promised by Kowallis renders the Order
unjust, illegal and a depravation of liberty in violation of Utah
Const. Art. I, § 7.
POINT III
THE TERM PARTISAN SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED NARROWLY
At page 24 of the Br. of Re., the Board claims that the
Order is not prohibited by the "partisan test or qualification"
clause of Art. X, § 8 of the Constitution of Utah because the "term
'partisan'

is

generally

associated

with

participation

in

a

particular political party," and because Plaintiffs ignore the
"common political connotation of the term." Incredibly, in support
4

of that proposition the Board cites Utah Const. Arte VIII, § 9,
clearly having to do with the politics of elections, and an Alaska
statutory

provision

which

reads

organization, faction or activity."
Plaintiffs' point.

"any

partisan

The Board thus makes the

Our Art. X, § 8 does not read:

political partisan test or qualification
contrary, such clause simply reads:

political

"No . . .
"

On the

"No . . . partisan test or

qualification . . . * "
The Board further ignores accepted rules of construction
with its urging that "partisan" has only a political connotation.
In a given context, as in the case of Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 9,
the term may have that connotation, to be sure, but the context of
its use in Utah Const. Art. X, § 8 is conclusive that more than a
political connotation is intended.

Section 8 proscribes any

"religious or partisan test or qualification . . ." (emphasis
added), making clear that politics was not the exclusive, or even
dominant concern of the framers. The history of the times confirms
that to be so. Historian Hubert Howe Bancroft chronicles how, in
the period immediately preceding statehood, the territory was rife
with

factionalism

"gentiles."

between

the

Mormons

and

non-Mormons, or

Non-Mormons were dispatched to govern the territory,

and the Poland anti-polygamy bill and the Edmunds bill virtually
disenfranchised the Mormons. Bancroft, History of Utah (1964) at
682-687.

The

factionalism.

education

system

was

subject

to

the

same

Mormons established private schools, frequently

operating out of church-owned buildings, to which gentiles were not
5

admitted, but gentiles were nevertheless required to support the
schools through taxes. Id. at 707-709. Such discrimination in the
context of the words used, clearly indicates that "partisan" in
Section 8 had reference to more than politics.

Just as plain is

that "partisan" refers to factionalism within society —• to the
dividing of

students

"into classes or groups and grant[ing]

allowfing] or provid[ing] one group privileges or advantages denied
another," as condemned in Logan City School District v. Kowallis,
77 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1938).

The Board's argument at page 25 of

the Br. of Re. that if Plaintiffs' position "were carried to any
logical conclusion, the Board would be precluded from making any
classifications between students even if there were compelling
reasons to do so," is a "straw man" argument.

That is not what

Plaintiffs contend. Plaintiffs have always conceded that given the
present Constitutional and statutory provisions in Utah, students
can be classified and assigned to attend a particular school for
legitimate reasons, but not for the "partisan" reasons relied upon
by the Board in adopting the Order.
The partisanship Section 8 sought to eradicate was the
partisanship born of blind, prejudiced, unreasoning, one-sided or
fanatical discrimination, whether it be based upon religion,
politics, race, ethnic origin, socio-economic status, academic
achievement, or any other improper divisions or classifications of
school patrons.

That is precisely why Art. X, § 8 can be used to

strike down the Order in the case at bar.

6

At page 24 of the Br. of Re., the Board also accuses the
Plaintiffs of excluding the "element of belief or adherence to a
cause" from the concept of partisanship.

The Board's argument

presumes that such belief constituting the prohibited "partisan
test or qualification" must exist only in the minds of the persons
subjected to the test or qualification.

Clearly, by definition

partisanship evidenced by the blind, prejudicial, discriminatory,
unreasoning, fanatical, one-sided beliefs of the parties indulging
in the partisan conduct, is no less constitutionally offensive than
such partisanship in the minds of the targets of such partisanship.
The Order cannot escape Constitutional condemnation by
the narrow construction of "partisan" urged by the Board.

POINT IV
THE ORDER WAS NOT WITHIN THE BOARD'S STATUTORY AUTHORITY
In Argument III beginning at page 27 and continuing
through page 41 of the Br. of Re., the Board argues that the Order
is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20.
pages, the Board has no reply —

In all of those 14

not one word —

to the plain

holding of this Court, that a child "can[not] be lawfully denied
admission to the schools of the State because of . . . location"
or "for any cause except the child's own conduct, behavior or
health" (emphasis added).
P.2d 348, 350 (1938).
propositions

Logan School District v. Kowallis, 77

Neither has the Board any response to the

that, in the absence of segregation or similar

Constitutional limitations, the parents' right to supervise the
7

education of their child transcends the parens patriae claims of
the

state,1 the education

system may

not be manipulated

to

"standardize its children,"2 efforts to do so are "arbitrary"
unless they have a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the
competency of the state to affect"3 (viz.., as defined at Utah Code
Ann. § 53-6-20), and that "more than merely a 'reasonable relation'
to some purpose within the competency of the state is required"4
to justify a limitation on the "interests of parenthood."5

These

are the fundamental propositions controlling this controversy.
They may not be brushed aside, as the Board attempts to do in its
Argument III.
Neither may the Board avoid those holdings by urging that
the enumeration of powers at Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20(1) through
(13) may be ignored on the theory that the power to do "all [other]
things necessary" means it may do anything "convenient," "useful,"
"appropriate," "suitable," "proper" and "conducive."

See Br. of

Re. at page 35.
Urging that the term "necessary," as used in Utah Code
Ann. § 53-6-20(14), has such broad meaning, is unsupported by the
authorities cited and contrary to accepted rules of statutory
construction. Beard v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P.2d 900
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-4 (1972).
2

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 540, 534-5 (1925).

3

Mever v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 290, 399-400 (1923).

Wisconsin v. Yoder, op. cit. note 2 at 232.
5

Id.
8

(1932), cited at Br. of Re. page 24, is no authority for that
proposition, and to the contrary, plainly held that:
The board of education, being a creation of the
Legislature, has only such powers as are
expressly conferred upon it and such implied
powers as are necessary to execute and carry
into effect its express powers. Id. at 903.
The Court in Beard merely concluded that school buildings could be
used for organized student dances, lectures, shows, games and
entertainment, because a careful analysis of the Utah statutes
indicated that such activities were part of the educational system
as defined by our legislature.
Thus while "necessary" may, in a given context, mean
something

less

than

"indispensable,"

the

statement

of

that

proposition by the Board is plainly another argument against a
"straw man." Plaintiffs have made no such claim. To the contrary,
we have urged merely that:
The generality of such language, preceded by
a specific enumeration of powers, is uniformly
limited by the doctrine eiusdem generis. See
BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951), and the
other authorities cited at pp. 33, 34 of
Plaintiffs' original Brief.
The definition of "necessary" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
(4th Ed.) is also very instructive:
NECESSARY. This word must be considered in the
connection in which it is used, as it is a word
susceptible of various meanings. It may import
absolute physical necessity or inevitability,
or it may import that which is only convenient,
useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or
conducive to the end sought.
It is an
adjective expressing degrees, and may express
mere convenience or that which is indispensable
or an absolute physical necessity. It may mean
something which in the accomplishment of a

9

given object cannot be dispensed with or it may
mean something reasonably useful and proper,
and of greater or lesser benefit or
convenience, and its force and meaning must be
determined with relation to the particular
object sought. (Citation omitted.)
Consequently, that which is "necessary," in the context of thirteen
specific, enumerated powers, is that which is appropriate to the
powers enumerated.

It is not merely that which is "convenient" to

the whims of an occasional, bare majority of the Board.

Beard is

not to the contrary, for it held that the "entire control" of the
Board must be exercised within "these sections."
Also helpful is a well reasoned, unpublished 1983 opinion
by Judge Bruce S« Jenkins construing a different section of Utah
Code Ann. Title 53.

The distinguished federal judge wrote as

follows:
" . . , in seeking statutory interpretations
that comport with the Constitution, courts
should read the questioned statute in the
context of other, similar laws on the same
subject. See e.g., Kokoszka v. Bedford, 417
U.S. 642 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a statute,
the court will not look merely to a particular
clause in which general words may be used, but
will take in connection with it the whole
statute (or statutes on the same subject) and
the objects and policy of the laws, as
indicated by its various provisions, and give
to it such a construction as will carry into
execution the will of the legislature . . . .
/H
Id., at 650, quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19
How. 183, 194 (1957)); Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ("We believe . . .
we must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but should look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object
and policy" JEd. at 11 (footnote omitted)).
This Court must review section 53-4-15 on its
face and within the context of other similar
statutory provisions and seek a rational
interpretation that will allow the statute to
10

be upheld. Downey v. Burnincrham, Docket No.
83-1004J (U.S.D.C., D. Utah, decided 1983) at
pp. 4-5.
For the convenience of the Court and counsel, Judge Jenkins'
unpublished opinion is attached in the Addendum.
The point — which the Board ignores —

is that nothing

in the thirteen paragraphs preceding Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-20(14),
refers to or fairly implies a power to balance the enrollment
between the schools along racial, socio-economic
achievement lines.

or academic

Nothing in the thirteen paragraphs preceding

paragraph (14) declares, or reasonably implies, that the Board can,
or should divide students into attendance groups based upon their
race, or the circumstances of residing among those deemed poor or
rich or high or low in academic achievement. Serious, frightening
consequences would attend implication of such a power.

Shall we,

then, have students bussed between Price and Salt Lake City, or
even within Salt Lake or Carbon Counties, to achieve such a
balance?
Furthermore, if we were to give the meaning to the term
"necessary" as urged by the Board, who could look Mrs. Espinal and
her children in the eye without blinking and say, as the Board does
at p. 35 of the Br. of Re., that the Order is "convenient, useful,
appropriate, suitable, proper and conducive" to the promotion of
the education of her children, as they are bussed across Salt Lake
City to a school distant from them. Especially when the Board says
to them that they are being bussed because of their minority and

11

socio-economic status, and because they come from a neighborhood
of low academic achievers.
In its Argument III/ the Board also fails to offer any
reply to the admitted fact that the Order gerrymandered the high
school boundaries. To gerrymander means to "divide (an area) into
political

units

to

give

special

advantages

to

one

group

(gerrymander a school district)." See Webster's 9th New Collegiate
Dictionary, 1988.

Of course, as discussed at pp. 2 and 3 above,

that is precisely what the Order did, and precisely why the Board
cannot

respond

to

Plaintiff's

gerrymandered the boundaries.

contention

that

the

order

Nothing in § 53-6-20 expressly or

impliedly empowers the Board to enforce such a decision, and thus,
by the act of gerrymandering alone, the Order exceeds any powers
granted the Board by the Utah legislature, particularly § 53-620.

CONCLUSION
It is significant that at pp. 41 and 42 of the Br. of
Re., the Board concedes that for "compelling reasons" this Court
can review and strike down the Order.

In the instant case, those

compelling reasons consist of the Order's violation of Plaintiffs'
rights as guaranteed by Art. I, § 7 and Art. X, § 8 of the
Constitution of Utah, and the Order being ultra vires the express
and

implied

powers of the whole statutory

scheme of public

education at the time of the Order, as provided in Utah Code Ann.
Title

53,

and

particularly

by
12

Section

53-6-20

thereof.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs urge that the summary judgment in favor of
the Board be reversed and that this matter be remanded to the
district court with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor
of Plaintiffs, including without limitation, directing notice to
the Board of the particulars in which the Order violates the
Constitution of Utah and exceeds the powers of the Board as granted
by the statutes of the State of Utah, and giving the Board
reasonable opportunity to rescind the Order and develop a voluntary
plan consistent with Utah law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of October, 1989.

<r>&y
•
Kent B Linebaugh
Attorney for Plaintiffs

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies
of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants was mailed, firstclass, postage prepaid, to:
M. Byron Fisher
John E.S. Robson
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A Professional Corporation
215 S. State Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
this 18th day of October, 1989.

Kent B Linebaugh
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ADDENDUM
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

PHILIP GORDON DOWNEY, an
individual, and RANDI FULLER,
an individual, and as
Guardian ad Litem for
Kimberly Ann Downey,

Case No. C 83-1004J

Plaintiffs,
vs.
G. LELAND BURNINGHAM,
individually and as Superintendent of Public 'Instruction,
Utah State Board of Education
and its members JAY A. MONSON,
NEOLA BROWN, JESSE ANDERSON,
LILA BJORKLUND, JOAN BURNSIDE,
A. GLENN CHRISTENSEN, EMMA J.
CHRISTENSEN, RODNEY L. DAHL,
ROSS P. DENHAM, JOHN P. REDD,
and KARL SHISLER, and the
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, father and aunt, individually and aunt as
Guardian ad Litem, of Kimberly Ann Downey, brought this action
against the Utah State Superintendent of Public Instruction, the
Utah State Board of Education, and the Board of Education of the
Jordan School District.

No. C 83-1004J

-2-

In their complaint, plaintiffs assert that a newly
1/

enacted Utah statute as well as the conduct of the defendants,
2/
violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Plaintiffs

ask that the statute be

declared void.
Defendant School District had sought a $1,780 tuition
payment as a pre-condition to the registration and attendance
of Kiraberly Downey at school.

At an initial hearing held

shortly after this action was commenced, the parties agreed that
Kimberly Downey could attend school without prepayment of
tuition until this matter was fully adjudicated.

Briefs were

thereafter submitted and the matter was argued to the Court on
September 26, 1983.

The parties further agreed that the issue

presented to the Court at this stage of the proceeding was
whether the statute was on its face violative of the Constitution
of the United States.
1/ Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-15 (Supp. 1983).
2/ The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; . . . .ff U. S. Const, amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
Without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const, amend., 14 § 1.

No. C 83-1004J

-3-

The Court, at this stage of the proceeding, is not
asked to decide whether the action of the Jordan School District
in applying the statute violated the Constitution.

The question

presented is a facial question, not an application question.
Plaintiff Philip Downey, father of Kimberly Downey,
is domiciled and resides outside the State of Utah.

He is a

construction worker currently residing in Washington state.
Kim's mother is deceased.

Because of his desire that

Kim be reared in a traditional family environment, Philip Downey
arranged with his sister, Randi Fuller, for Kim to reside with
the Fuller family.

Kim has lived with the Fuller family for

three and one-half years.
In 1982 the Fuller family and Kimberly Downey moved
to Sandy, Utah, located in the Jordan School District.

During

the school year 1982-83, the Fuller children and Kim Downey
attended school in the Jordan School District.

In August, 1983,

Randi Fuller attempted to register Kim in school at the Eastmont
Middle School.

The school districtt as a prior condition, sought

the execution of a document annexed hereto as Exhibit

lf ,f

A , which

contains an acknowledgement of certain facts and an undertaking
to pay tuition.

The parties refused to execute the proffered

document and this action then resulted.

It is undisputed that

Kimberly Downey came to Utah for reasons other than attending
school and that attending school is merely incidental to her
living with the Fuller family.
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In my opinion the Jordan School District and the
Superintendent of Public Instruction have simply read the
statute too broadly; if the statute is appropriately read, no
question of constitutional proportion is presented-

Kimberly

Downey is simply unaffected and tuition ought not to be extracted by the school district as a condition for her attending
school.
Legal authority abounds that a statute enacted by the
legislature is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality.
See e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) ("State laws
are generally entitled to a presumption of validity against
attack under the Equal Protection clause1' id,. , at 351);
McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) ("Legislatures
are presumed to have acted constitutionally . . . .

and their

statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds
can be conceived to justify themM jld., at 809). Furthermore,
in seeking statutory interpretations that comport with the
Constitution, courts should read the questioned statute in the
context of other, similar laws on the same subject.

See e.g.,

Kokoszka v. Bel ford, 417 U.S. 642 (1974) ("When 'interpreting
a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause
in which general words may be used, but will take in connection
with it the whole statute (or statutes on the same subject) and
the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various
provisions, and give to it such a construction as wili carry
into execution the will of the legislature . . . .•" iA.

at 650,
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quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857)); Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962) ("We believe . . . we must
not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but
should look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy" iji. at 11 (footnote omitted)).

This Court

must review section 53-4-15 on its face and within the context
of other similar statutory provisions and seek a rational interpretation that will allow the statute to be upheld.
Utah chooses to administer its public school system
through distinct governmental units known as school districts.
See, Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-5 (1981).

Although the state has

twenty-nine counties, the state has forty school districts.
Interdistrict administrative problems have arisen from
time to time.

For example, a child living in one district needs

to attend school in another.

A child's parent may live in one

district and the child in another.

The amount of money each

school district receives from the state hinges in part on the
number of students attending school in the district; children
that attend school outside of the district in which they reside
can have significant impact on the budget of both where he lives
and where he goes to school.

See Utah Code Ann. sections

53-7-20, 53-7-21, 53-7-16(c)(d) (1981).
Resolution of interdistrict problems required a
uniform approach.

In an effort to resolve such problems, the

legislature enacted section 53-4-15 in 1983 so as to establish

No- C 83-1004J
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concrete standards and uniform methods to deal with recurring
interdistrict problems.

Section 53-4-15 states that:

(1) The school district of residence of a
minor child is:
(a) The school district in which the
parent or guardian who has legal custody
of the child is domiciled or, if the
parent or guardian has no domicile or is
assigned to active duty in Utah by the
United States Armed Forces, the school
district in which the parent or guardian
resides; or
(b) The school district in which the
child resides, if the child is in the
legal custody of a state or private
agency, or is an emancipated minor.
(2) Each school district is responsible for
providing educational services for all children
of school age who are residents of the district.
Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-15 (Supp. 1983).
Section 53-4-15 is in part a codification of the Utah
Supreme Court's decision in Logan City School District v.
Kowallis, 94 Utah 342, 77 P.2d 348 (1938).

That case concerned

the constitutionality of a Logan City school board ruling that
required all students who were not district residents to pay
tuition.

The Logan City School District sued residents of the

Cache County School District, who were attending school in
Logan but refused to pay tuition.

Defendant students alleged

that the school board was violating the Utah Constitution by
requiring Utah residents to pay tuition.

In analyzing the

constitutionality of the school board's regulations, the court
reviewed the legislature's approach to the public school system.
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"A review of all the

statutory enactments from the beginning shows a recognition of
the policy that children must attend school within the district
in which they reside, whenever there is provided within such
district, schools of proper grade and class to meet their needs
and requirements.11

]A.

at 353.

Based on this historical legis-

lative policy, the court held that:
The Cache County School District, having
provided adequate schools and facilities
equal to those of Logan City, open and free
and reasonably convenient for attendance of
all children within such district, all constitutional and statutory requirements have
been met, and no child within such district
has a legal right to insist upon attendance
at public schools elsewhere.
Id. at 353-54.

The court concluded that the requirement that a

resident of another school district must pay tuition in order
to attend school in a preferred district comported with history
and legislative intent, and did not violate the Utah Constitution,
On its face, section 53-4-15 is merely a legislative
effort to resolve the inter-district problem of a student
living in one district who wishes to attend school in another.
The statutory definition of a child's residence solves that
problem.

The statute presumes that a child's parent or guardian

is domiciled in or resides in a Utah school district and confines the child's residence to the domicile or residence of
the Utah-located parent or guardian.

However, if the child is

emancipated or is in the legal custody of a state or private
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agency, the statute provides that the child's residence will
determine where he should attend school.
The legislature's definition of "district of
residence11 for public school purposes simplifies a school
board's administrative difficulties.

By presuming that a child

resides with his Utah-located parent or guardian, the statute
allows an easy determination of which school a child should
attend.

The problems inherent in determining the number of

school-age children in a district for the purposes of allocating
state school funds are also eased.

The definition of a child's

district of residence is obviously applicable to interdistrict
problems.

Should the definition by implication and interpre-

tation be applied to interstate problems as well?
In my opinion it should not.
First, the statutory context in which the definition
section is found is primarily concerned with interdistrict
problems.

For example, section 53-4-16 allows a child who

resides in one district to attend school in another and allows
a school board to charge tuition; section 53-4-17 regulates
relations between districts and allows one district to pay
another when a school district resident goes to school in
another district.

Second, extension by interpretation to inter-

state problems could well raise serious constitutional problems
which are not raised by the construction herein adopted.

Third,

if the legislature wishes to address interstate problems beyond

No. C 83-1004J
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what they have done in section 53-4-18 $ which permits a school
board to allow a child "residing" outside Utah to attend school
within the state upon payment of tuition, it may do so.
Under the present statute it has not done so.
point made is narrow, but important.

The

The-father of Kim Downey

is neither a doraicilary nor a resident of a school district in
Utah.

Thus her presumptive "district of residence" is net

determined by her father's location in Utah.
He does not live here.

She is here.

He is not here.

She lives here with her

aunt, Randi Fuller and the Fuller family.

The definition

simply fails to define the residence of a child, living in Utah,
whose parent lives outside the borders of the state and it need
not do so.

The likelihood of an interdistrict problem arising

from such facts is minimal.

The presumption does not carry

beyond the border because the definition is confined to a
parent or guardian located in the state.
There is further statutory guidance which requires
that Kim be admitted to school without the payment of tuition.
The Utah Constitution requires that "[T]he legislature
shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a uniform
system of public schools, which shall be open to all children
of the State, . . . .", Utah Const. Art. X, section 1, and
defines the "public schools" as follows:
The public school system shall include
kindergarten schools, common schools, consisting of primary and grammar grades;
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high schools; an agricultural college; a
university; and such other schools as
the legislature may establish. The common
schools shall be free. The other departments of the system shall be supported as
provided by law.
Utah Const. Art. X sec. 2.
The Utah legislature has done more than implement
the mandate of the Utah Constitution by providing that n[I]n
each school district, the public schools shall be free to all
children between the ages of 5 and 18 years who are residents
of the district/1 Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-7 (1981).
ture has also mandated that

The legisla-

f,

[e]ach school district is

responsible for providing educational services for all children
of school age who are residents of the district• "

Utah Code

Ann. § 53-4-15(2) (Supp. 1983).
The Utah Code also places affirmative duties on
persons exercising control over the child to ensure that the
child attends school:

"Every parent, guardian or other person

having control of any minor between 6 and 18 years of age shall
be required to send such minor to a public or regularly
established private school during the regularly established
school year of the district in which lie resides."

Utah Code

Ann. § 53-24-1 (1981).

The parent,

"He" refers to the child.

guardian, or other person who willfully fails to comply is
guilty of a misdemeanor.

Id_. § 53-24-3 (1981) (emphasis added).

Although the Utah Code does not affirmatively require
the child to attend school, the child may be subject to

-11sanctions for failure to attend*
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For example, a person may be

taken into temporary custody by a peace officer, truant officer,
or public school administrator "if there is reason to believe
the person is a child subject to the state1s compulsory education law and that the child is absent from school without a
legitimate or valid excuse*"
1983).

Utah Code Ann. § 53-24-23 (Supp.

Or, if the child is found to be "an habitual truant from

school," the child is subject to the broad remedial powers of
the juvenile court.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3A-16 (Supp. 1981);

see id. § 78-3A-39 (Supp. 1981).
In my opinion, the word"resides" found in § 54-24-1 is
used with the common sense meaning of "lives" or "is located."
Handi Fuller, not as a parent or a guardian, but as an "other
person having control" must see to it that Kim attends school
in accordance with legislative direction, and the Jordan School
District must receive and provide Kim with the education to
which she is entitled.
This view is fortified by a recent pronouncement of
the United States Supreme Court.
U.S.

In Martinez v. Bynum,

, 51 U.S.L.W. 4524 (May 2, 1983), the United States

Supreme Court defined residence:

"fResidence* generally requires

both physical presence and an intention to remain. . . .

This

classic two-part definition of residence has been recognized as
a minimum standard in a wide range of contexts time and time
again."

LcL at 4526.

Kim meets the Martinez definition of
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She is physically present in Utah.

Her father

intends that Kim live with her aunt, and Kim, herself, intends
to live with her aunt's family in Utah,

Kim is not residing in

Utah for the primary purpose of attending school; rather, her
reason for being in Utah is to live in a stable family
environment.
Because § 53-4-15 does not apply to Kim, the school
district must treat her as it treats other residents.

The

Jordan School District is required by state law to provide free
public schools to all children ages 5 to 18 who are residents
of the district.

Kim is twelve years old and is a resident of

the Jordan School District.

Therefore, the Jordan School Dis-

trict must allow Kimberly Ann Downey to attend school within
the district without requiring her to pay tuition.
This is not to say that a legislature might not adopt
and a school district might not implement a rational policy for
dealing with out-of-state students who come to Utah for the
primary or sole purpose of gaining an education.

Certainly one

may adopt a definition, a standard, and a procedure for appropriate fact determinations in conformity with an expressly
defined policy.

In this instance, that has simply not been

done.
There being no need to reach the constitutional
question, the petition to declare the statute void in violation
of the Constitution is denied, and counsel for plaintiff is

-13-

No. C 83-1004J

directed to prepare and submit a form of judgment in conformity
herewith.
DATED this ^ ^

day of November, 1983.
BY THE COURT:

EXHIBIT H B"

A G R E E M E N T

THIS AGREEMENT is entered into on this the
, 19

day of

, by JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT (hereafter

•the District") and
(hereafter "Patrons");
WHEREAS, the Utah State Legislature has recently passed
legislation, Senate Bill 232, authorizing the Jordan School
District to institute a nonresident child tuition program; and
WHEREAS, the Jordan School District has calculated that
the per capita cost in the Jordan School District for educating
students is $1,782.00 for the school year 1983-84; and
/{,'/n

WHEREAS, Patrons agree that

h//>//

/7*/>

/?S;/S)/7SLS

(Student's rfame)

s

is an out-of-state student who, pursuant to Senate Bill 232, may
lawfully be assessed the per capita cost of the District; and
WHEREAS, Patrons are attempting to obtain legal^gustody of
Kl mbfs/i/

(Student' s

/?nrt

L\y//)/i SL/

and thus not be required to

r f a m e ) 7

pay a nonresident child tuition; and
WHEREAS, the legal process to establish such guardianship
and control has been delayed beyond the date that school begins;
and
WHEREAS, the District seeks to accommodate the Patrons
by extending the time in which the tuition is to be paid;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

!•

^

Patrons will be allowed to enroll

£& *£„,*„! M/jJ/f
(Name of school)

/ /Wfr//

and the District will allow

/7//>7 ()S>AS)J>sy

(Student''s name)
2.

STA^A.'/

(Studentf-s name)-

to attend classes.

/

Patrons agree that on or before the

day of

, 1983, they will present to the District
evidence of guardianship and/or legal custody in the form of
duly executed court documents.
3.

If Patrons do not present evidence as outlined in

Paragraph 2, Patrons agree to pay the District nonresident child
tuition in the amount of $1,782.00.

Patrons agree to pay said

amount to the District on or before

JORDAN SCHOOL DISTRICT

By

PATRON

PATRON

_ , 1983.

'

